考虑非线性奖惩机制的多主体主从博弈模型

Multi-agent master-slave game model considering nonlinear reward and punishment mechanism

中文关键词  电力市场  奖惩机制  博弈论  纳什均衡  分布式算法

英文关键词  power markets  reward and punishment mechanism  game theory  Nash equilibrium  distributed algorithm

中文摘要

      本文针对以往电价机制仅由供方主导而缺乏电能供需双向调节功能的缺点问题, 构建了一个考虑双边非 线性奖惩机制的电力市场多主体主从博弈模型, 以实现市场多主体的利益均衡. 首先, 在零售端提出了一种由供需 双方共同参与且具有动态奖惩激励的电价机制. 其次, 在此基础上构建了一个以零售商为领导者、用户为跟随者的 主从博弈模型, 同时利用演化博弈描述用户的动态选择过程. 然后, 证明了该主从博弈模型纳什均衡解的存在性, 并设计了分布式算法进行求解. 最后, 通过算例分析证明了本文所提博弈模型的合理性, 并验证了电价机制在引导 用户合理用电、保证供需平衡以及实现成本节约等方面的有效性; 同时仿真结果表明给出的分布式求解算法具有 较快的收敛速度和良好的稳定性能.

英文摘要

      Given the shortcomings of the previous electricity price mechanism, which was only dominated by the supplier and lacked the bidirectional regulation function of power supply and demand, this paper constructs a multi-agent master-slave game model in the power markets considering bilateral nonlinear reward and punishment mechanism, to realize the interest balance of multi-agents in the market. Firstly, an electricity price mechanism with dynamic reward and punishment incentives is proposed on the retail side, which is jointly participated by both supply and demand sides. Next, a master-slave game model with retailers as leaders and users as followers is developed on this basis. Meanwhile, the evolutionary game is used to describe the user’s dynamic selection process. Then, the existence of the Nash equilibrium solution of the master-slave game is proved and the distributed algorithm is designed to solve the Nash equilibrium solution. Finally, the rationality of the game model proposed in this paper is proved by an example analysis, and the effectiveness of the electricity price mechanism in guiding users to use electricity reasonably, ensuring the balance between supply and demand, and realizing cost saving is also verified. And the simulation results show that the distributed algorithm has a fast convergence speed and good stability.