基于博弈竞价的区域综合能源系统运营弹性增强策略

Enhancing operational resilience of regional integrated energy systems via a game-based bidding strategy

中文关键词  区域综合能源系统  弹性增强  Stackelberg博弈

英文关键词  regional integrated energy system  resilience enhancement  Stackelberg game

中文摘要

      能源系统故障可能导致巨大的经济损失, 因此, 提升能源系统的运营弹性具有重要意义. 为了提高区域综合能源系统在市场机制下的弹性, 本文提出了一种基于博弈的能源竞标策略. 首先, 建立了区域综合能源系统模型,其中包括能源控制中心、能源枢纽、储能系统和用户聚合商. 为了在市场环境下通过价格引导弹性增强, 构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的能源竞标框架, 通过调整能源零售价格和需求响应激励价格等策略, 以减小能源缺口并降低价格波动. 考虑到参与者间的隐私保护, 设计了双层迭代定价算法. 最后, 通过仿真算例说明了所提策略在保证供需平衡的同时有效抑制价格波动, 从而降低经济损失.

英文摘要

      Energy system outages can lead to huge economic losses, so it is important to enhance the operational resilience of energy systems. To improve the resilience of regional integrated energy systems (RIESs) operated in market mechanism, this paper proposes a game-based energies bidding strategy. A RIES consisting of an energy control center (ECC), an energy hub (EH), a battery energy storage system (ESS) and a user aggregator (UA) is modelled. In order to enhance the resilience of RIESs through a pricing mechanism, a Stackelberg game-based energies bidding framework are designed beyond the RIES model. By adjusting retail prices and incentive price, energy imbalance is eliminated and price fluctuation is reduced. Furthermore, a bi-level iterative bidding algorithm is developed to protect privacy and reduce computational burden. Finally, numerical results are given to illustrate that the proposed strategy can suppress prices fluctuation while maintaining energy balance.